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The works of the muse lack the force of the
spirit which, from out of the crushing of the
gods and of man, has engendered its cer-
tainty of itself. They are now what they are
for us – beautiful fruit broken off from the
tree, a friendly fate passing those works on
to us as a gift, in the way a young girl
might present that fruit; the actual life in
which that fruit existed no longer exists,
nor does the tree that bore them, nor the
earth and the elements that constituted
their substance, nor the climate that consti-
tuted their determinateness, nor the alterna-
tion of the seasons that governed the process
of their coming-to-be.1
1 introduction
F or long-time collaborators PhilippeLacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy,
the question underpinning aesthetic philos-
ophy is less what is art? than what was art?
This apparently simple shift creates a narrative
centred on the scene of art’s dissolution or
passing. Of course, such a narrative predates
these two thinkers, notably in the work of
G.W.F. Hegel, and it is by engaging with this
philosopher that they develop their views on
the issue.2 The broader Hegelian or post-Hege-
lian frame is the way in which the different
periods of history are interpreted as the
phased march of spirit realizing or fulfilling
itself. But Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy devote
particular efforts to understanding what effect
the scene of art’s disappearance has, both
within this frame, and insofar as art’s disap-
pearance allows such framing to be overspilled.
As these two thinkers assess Hegel’s claims
about one phase of the historical dialectic
passing to the next, therefore, it is crucial to
understand what we might call the passing pres-
ence of art, the presence of art as it passes or
passes away.
What might it mean to claim that art was,
but is not? Hegel’s claim looks to ancient
Greek culture and the sense of oneness
uniting art, religion, and society that it alleg-
edly enjoyed. Hegel’s term “æsthetic religion,”
cited by Nancy, refers precisely to this
oneness.3 And if ancient art is thus defined as
a central vector of ancient society, modern art
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by extension is thought to have lost this role,
having become fragmentary and marginal
rather than plenary and unifying. Early
German Romanticism, on which Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy wrote extensively (not
least in The Literary Absolute), reacts to
these characterizations of ancient and modern
art by a nostalgia for the former state of
affairs, but also by a desire to forge art anew,
re-founding its importance.4 Thus Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy write about the Jena
Romantics’ philological backgrounds and Frie-
drich Hölderlin’s work on the Greeks, but also
about Romanticism’s programmatic element,
its desire to found a new mythology, to
reunite art, religion, and politics under the
ægis of an infinitized or absolutized Subject.
It is thus possible to see a common thesis in
both Hegel and the German Romantics: art
was, but is not. The difference, however,
comes with the question of whether art’s
passing must be seen as definitive or not. For
Hegel, it is definitive, and art – having
reached its apogee with the Greeks – has been
replaced by other manifestations of spirit:
either revealed religion or philosophy (depend-
ing on where he makes the claim, as we shall
see). For the Romantics, art may yet be
refounded, and creating the conditions for
this to occur is a task that artistic movements
and groups must pursue.
This initial difference between Hegel and the
Romantics, regarding the future of thought,
also led to a second difference, this time
found in (even) murkier waters. For where the
Romantics’ fusionalism led them to advocate
something like a practice of life-as-art, invol-
ving collaborative, anonymous writing and the
explosion of the traditional sexual order,
Hegel disapproved of their activities. Lacoue-
Labarthe describes him as critiquing the
Romantics’ “æsthetic and moral […] ‘nihi-
lism,’” which, he tells us in French, “ne
‘passe’ pas – ou passe trop.”5 In using the
verb passer, Lacoue-Labarthe thus indicates
that for Hegel such alleged aesthetic and
moral nihilism, first, must not be accepted
(passe), but second, that this is the case pre-
cisely because it passe trop, i.e., it “escapes
and evades being mastered by the dialectic,”
is too much inclined towards movement and
flightiness.6 Romanticism for Hegel rep-
resented liberality, dissolution or dissoluteness,
or what Nancy names in an eponymous essay
menstruum (letting-go or discharge).7 On this
view, Romantic promises of re-founding a
mythology are pie-in-the-sky, and it is better,
faced with art’s passing, to work with and
through the more solid categories of revealed
religion and/or philosophy.
In attempting to unpack these notions more
fully, we shall begin with a Nancy text named
“The Young Girl who Succeeds the Muses
(the Hegelian Birth of the Arts),” which deals
with the Hegelian thesis of art’s passing and
presents us with the enigmatic figure in which
the thesis is incarnated: a young girl offering
up a fruit. We will then move on to Lacoue-
Labarthe’s oeuvre, reading his long early
essay “The Unpresentable,” which addresses
Hegel and Romanticism, the ancient (complete)
and modern (incomplete) instantiations of art,
and the question of veils, revelation, and pres-
entation in and through both artistic form and
worldliness in general.8
2 nancy, “the young girl who
succeeds the muses (the hegelian
birth of the arts)”
It is difficult to set limits on any discussion of
æsthetics in Nancy’s oeuvre. There is little
clear boundary between his æsthetics, his phe-
nomenology, and his philosophy of religion,
for instance, in Visitation: Of Christian Paint-
ing, Noli me tangere, The Pleasure of
Drawing, or elsewhere.9 Similarly, where
might we even attempt to draw a line between
Nancy’s thinking of æsthetics and the entire
line of thinking around touching, sensation,
and sense? And which of the philosophers he
has written on, from Kant to Nietzsche to Hei-
degger, is not also a major aesthetician in his
own right?10
But in The Muses he does discuss one par-
ticularly beguiling figure: that of a young girl
who is presented as the successor to the
art’s passing
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Muses who held sway over ancient conceptions
of art.11 This young girl is thereby associated
with the ending of that ancient dispensation,
and with the onset of a modern appreciation
of the arts (or of modernity’s non-appreciation
of the arts). Her arrival or appearance on the
scene therefore intervenes at a critical juncture
as we follow Hegel’s narrative of art’s role in the
historical dialectic and the eventual self-realiz-
ation of spirit. In other words, the scene on
which she arrives is the Hegelian one of art’s
passing, constituted by the claim that art was,
rather than is. In introducing the topic,
Nancy is careful to distinguish what Hegel
states and does not state, as well as drawing a
distinction between the statements made in
two different works:
It is now well established that what is attrib-
uted to Hegel as the declaration of the “end
of art” is only the declaration of an ending to
what he called “æsthetic religion,” which is
to say art as the site for the appearance of
the divine. Doubtless, the religion that is
abandoned in this way is the Greek religion,
and the one that succeeds it (notwithstand-
ing the episode of Rome, to which we shall
return), “revealed” or Christian religion, is
de jure beyond art. However, things are far
from being this simple in Hegel himself.
Indeed, whilst he does not mention Christian
art in the Phenomenology of Spirit (in
which, by contrast, we find the episode of
the “young girl” we will be discussing), the
importance of art in the Æsthetics is well
known, indeed art represents its central
moment (the centre of this centre in turn
being painting). But in the Æsthetics, it is
not revealed religion that succeeds art, but
philosophy or the element of pure thought.
(M 75–76)
Here Nancy begins by stating that Hegel’s
thesis of the passing of art does not in fact
exclude the continued existence or practice of
art, but merely strips it of any religious
status, notably the unified, plenary status that
art enjoyed in ancient Greece. This is to say
that after this key scene of its passing, art can
very well carry on de facto but it will not exist
de jure. Nancy then distinguishes the two
mutually exclusive narrative developments pro-
vided by Hegel: according to the first, revealed
religion will be what succeeds this aesthetic reli-
gion, with art now only having a subsidiary or
illustrative role, rather than being a true mani-
festation of spirit. According to Hegel’s second
narrative, philosophy or pure thought is what
takes up the baton from aesthetic religion. It
seems likely that this can be taken to mean phil-
osophy not as our contemporary academic dis-
cipline, but as the broader search for truth,
incorporating natural science as well as huma-
nistic thought, as it did for any number of
figures from Pythagoras to Pascal.
Having established this general account of
Hegel’s views, and thereby of the founding
principles of the modern science of æsthetics,
Nancy zooms in on the figure of the young
girl carrying the fruit. She succeeds the
Muses, meaning that she represents the
closure or the passing of the ancient under-
standing of art as falling under their powers.
But what might she instead represent, what
alternative way of relating to art? Does she
allow for any relation to art at all, or instead
symbolize the passing of art’s relevance to
spirit: art’s passing? Glossing her appearance,
Nancy writes as follows:
The young girl who is at once the infinitely
fragile extremity of art and the infinitely sus-
tained passage of beautiful form as form is
transformed into truth – this young girl
has no existence other than that of the
fruits that she presents. (M 96)
The notion of art being at once fragile and
extreme, either in its thematic content or in
the sense of operating or occurring whenever
there are extremities or endings, is reasonably
well-established within the alternative canon
that we can imagine Nancy reading (Sade,
Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot). The statement
on the young girl representing “the infinitely
sustained passage of beautiful form as form is
transformed into truth” is slightly more
complex: it is tempting to focus on the trans-
formation into truth, which would place us
firmly back into the former, ancient aesthetic
religion (with artistic form communicating
mckeane
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directly with truth, the girl being an allegory
and as such enjoying epistemic privileges).
However, the words “the infinitely sustained
passage” undermine this reading. They
suggest that, whilst the destiny or purpose of
form might well be to transform into truth,
this passing or passage is in fact stretched out
infinitely, never completed. In other words,
“beautiful form” must always remain at a dis-
tance from truth, unable to unite with it.
Even though “beautiful form” may seem to
be a classicizing rather than radically modern
category, Nancy identifies it as a surplus or
remainder, forever excluded from its purpose.
But what has happened to the fruits? Both in
this text and in another collected in The Muses
(“Why are there Several Arts and not Just
One?”), Nancy interprets these as representing
art in the modern rather than ancient dispensa-
tion. This is to say that the plural fruits rep-
resent the plural arts in the modern (i.e., not
ancient) age, over and against the unified aes-
thetic religion of Athens.12 The bucolic image
of the young girl bearing fruit is turned to
Nancy’s purpose: the descriptive detail of the
fruits underlines the sheer thereness, patency
or worldly existence that these fruits share
with the arts (we can read: “that there should
be several arts, that is something that is
exposed as patency” (M 62; original emphasis)).
These fruits/arts just are, they are in the world,
without any connection to the gods that is
directly understood, felt, or culturally sanc-
tioned. As such the bucolic or painterly qual-
ities of the figure of the young girl serve to
subtract her from Hegel’s dialectic as it re-
morselessly motors on to the next stage in the
development of spirit (and it seems possible
that his depiction of this figure as a young girl
served to underline the lack of significance in
his eyes). In any case, Nancy will confirm the
fruits’ (i.e., the arts’) connection with mortality
– rather than with immortal divinity – when he
writes that “the ‘fine fruits’ are detached from
the tree, and the fact of their presentation con-
sents to this being-detached, this being mor-
tally immortal.” This leads him to ask: “And
if art was only ever the art, necessarily plural,
and singular, of consenting to death, of
consenting to existence?” (M 97). In other
words, the fruits’ separation from the plant
tells us not only that they are ripe for eating,
but that at this very moment of ripeness or
perfect culmination, decay and death are
setting in. The fruits are delicious, but they
are time-limited pleasures for now, rather
than something stored for later (one meaning
of the classically Hegelian term aufgehoben).
They exist fully in the here and now, thus repre-
senting a sort of finitude or worklessness, rather
than any dialectical carrying-over or afterlife.
Nancy’s formulation is instead a Heideggerian
one, insisting in its double shape on the co-
extensiveness of existence and mortality: “the
art […] of consenting to death, of consenting
to existence.”13
In sum, whilst the move away from aesthetic
religion could be understood as a loss, with the
attendant nostalgia for lost unity, it can also be
seen as a gain: we gain an understanding of our
being-in-the-world, a relationship to finitude
and mortality that the Greeks always already
sublated into a religious system. But this
modern understanding is difficult to hold on
to, and the dual temptations of nostalgia and
refoundation are strong. The Romantics bear
testament to that, with their dream of a gener-
alized or infinitized art that would unify not
only the separate modern arts, but also
domains including religion and politics. Let
us now turn to Lacoue-Labarthe to explore
this aspect in greater detail.
3 lacoue-labarthe, “the
unpresentable”
Published as forty large-format, small-type
pages in 1975, this piece shows a strikingly
mature level of reflection not only on the
topics of Romanticism and æsthetics on which
Lacoue-Labarthe would later publish much,
but also on the (post-)Heideggerian notions of
appearance, coming-to-presence, and being-in-
the-world that are more easily associated with
his collaborator Nancy. Let us begin by
looking at the article’s characterization of
modern art (via the question of whether art’s
art’s passing
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connection to its epoch is direct or indirect).
We can then explore what is said about the
ancient art of statuary, which allows Lacoue-
Labarthe to interrogate Hegel on his under-
standing of art’s passing.
The article is constructed around various
references by Hegel to Schlegel’s unfinished
free-love novel Lucinde, which he takes to
reveal a deep-seated frustration with – or fear
of – the Romantics’ lifestyle and ambitions.
Lacoue-Labarthe’s sympathies clearly lie with
the Romantics, with their project of realization
of spirit in and through poetry, rather than with
Hegel’s sublation of that sensible art-form into
a metaphysical system. Nonetheless he is clear-
eyed about which side of the debate went on to
have the greater recognition in the history of
thought, and the terms he uses to describe
Hegel’s victory are brutal ones. Lacoue-
Labarthe writes: “let us say, between Hegel
and alchemy, that the (silent, clandestine) dis-
solution, the Auflo ̈sung of literature left a
remainder, a residue, – a stunted specimen:
Hegel’s text […]” (IMP 55; original emphasis).
This victory was Hegel’s, with literature driven
from the field in disarray, although an implicit
trace of it remains with Hegel’s text being
seen – in the melancholy light of what literature
could have been – as a “remainder, residue, – a
stunted specimen.”
It is against such a backdrop that he will later
continue:
Hegel’s question is the following: can what is
to be thought, whatever it might be (Being,
truth, thought itself), be presented as such,
can it appear in its own element? For what
is to be thought, might being presented as
such and appearing in one’s own element –
ultimately – come down to not being pre-
sented or appearing at all? (Lacoue-
Labarthe, IMP 75; original emphases)
These rhetorical questions imply that Hegel
would prefer “what is to be thought” to find a
form proper to it, without having to deal with
the external possibilities afforded by art and/
or worldly reality (or art as worldly reality).
The questions then go on to imply that to
keep its hands clean in such a way would be
to pursue an unrealistic quest for purity,
because by definition all presentation must
include an element of alienation – or dirtying
– of whatever is being presented. For Lacoue-
Labarthe, the rivalrous other informing
Hegel’s intervention in this debate is Romanti-
cism: the Jena Romantics’ projects such as the
Athenaeum review, the mode of collective,
fragmentary writing they explored, and the
model of community that briefly underpinned
it. Let us move to see how this rivalry played
out, with particular reference to the question
of art’s passing.
3.1 modern art: out of time
Hegel as he is glossed by Lacoue-Labarthe in
“The Unpresentable” is highly sceptical about
the Romantics’ claim to make a return to
ancient religion, and thereby to do no less
than found a new mode of existence (both epis-
temic and communitarian). If Hegel also
believes that “art counts no longer as the
highest mode in which truth procures existence
for itself,” i.e., that modern art is not the equal
of its ancient predecessor, then his view of
Romanticism plants it firmly within that
modern category, denying the claim that it is
any different.
Although he is not directly associated with
the Jena group usually taken as Hegel’s interlo-
cutor by Lacoue-Labarthe, Friedrich Schiller is
mentioned at various points in the article in a
way that makes clear the role modern art
plays in Hegel’s claim about art’s passing. Ven-
triloquizing Hegel’s view of Schiller’s book The
Gods of Greece, Lacoue-Labarthe writes that:
The Gods of Greece […] does not mark any
epoch […] it can even be understood, in a
certain way, as illustrating this “absence of
epoch” that characterizes all the art of the
Moderns (as well as its unseasonal nostalgia
for its bygone age). (IMP 59; original
emphasis)
Although the Schiller work mentioned
addresses the Greek gods, it nonetheless
forms an example of modern art’s predicament,
namely, that it is no longer aligned with the
movement of spirit in its age (whether that
mckeane
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means in terms of religion, politics, or other
domains). This means that, paradoxically, art
from the modern age ultimately belongs to no
age: it is cosmopolitan, rootless, liberal, not sig-
nificant in any terms beyond its own. Shortly
afterwards, Lacoue-Labarthe expands on his
theme, again mentioning – in opposition to
Hegel – Schiller, but now bringing in the Jena
Romantics too. In Hegel’s view, we read,
Schiller de-limits the pre-speculative
moment which precedes philosophy’s
uplift [levée] (the philosophical relève of
philosophy itself), this fringe (less unde-
cided than contradictory, and therefore
“fecund”) in which a certain poetic truth of
philosophy (and a philosophical truth of
poetry), insofar as it takes itself for its own
object, summons the absolute Idea, the
truth represented by the identity of identity
and difference, the identity of the sensible
and the intelligible. It is still too early to
clarify what this truth, which we can call
poı ̈etic, actually is. What is important is
that nothing in Romanticism has ever been
able to gain access to it – and least of all,
let us come back to this point, the Schlegels.
The reason for this is, quite simply, that
Romanticism is more than Schiller’s nega-
tive: it is the corrosive “milieu” in which,
indistinctly but irreversibly, the possibility
of philosophy recognizing its own and “con-
serving” anything at all is dissolved, art
having (finally) understood, even whilst con-
tinuing its stubborn denials, that as such it is
no longer of its epoch, and has not been so
for a long time. (Lacoue-Labarthe, IMP 60;
original emphases)
In other words, the object of Hegel’s search, the
identity of identity and difference, that which
he believes allows him to rise above the relati-
vistic mess of history, is only referred to
indirectly in Schiller’s work. Any allusion to
it remains debatable, poetic, a second-hand
glimpse of the significance of philosophy,
rather than a full self-realization. Schiller’s
claim thus having been rejected in a measured
way, Lacoue-Labarthe then depicts how Hegel
deals with Romanticism – this time, the rejec-
tion is more brutal. Rather than not fully
stating or realizing a goal that nonetheless is
also shared by Hegel, the Romantics’ activities
are said to actively militate against this goal.
These activities are corrosive and dissolute,
both epistemically and, it is implied by the
strength of the terms being used, morally as
well. The end result is that modern art, to
which the Romantics for Hegel belong, “is no
longer of its epoch, and has not been so for a
long time.” The modernity to which this art
belongs is therefore not a category simply mir-
roring the ancient era; instead, it is a paradoxi-
cal epoch where time is out of joint, whose
artistic productions only belong to the age
insofar as they do not belong to it, which is to
say loosely, without direction, by default. Art
in its ancient role having passed away,
modern art is the art of passing, leaving us
only with passing thoughts, with the anonymity
and superficiality of passers-by.
3.2 ancient art: statuary
If early German Romanticism looks nostalgi-
cally towards ancient Greek art, this does not
mean that its rival, Hegel, underestimated the
importance of this art. For him, it presented a
full realization of everything that art was
capable of (even as some tasks or roles
remained impossible for art, which is one of
his points of disagreement with the Romantics).
In Hegel’s Æsthetics, Greek aesthetic religion
is primarily identified with statuary and its cel-
ebration of the (athletic) human form as divine
or quasi-divine. Lacoue-Labarthe discusses this
in terms of the questions of gender, sexuality,
and the moral scandal (for Hegel) raised by
the Romantic Friedrich Schlegel’s novel
Lucinde which, Lacoue-Labarthe ventriloquizes,
is “an affront to modesty [pudeur]” (IMP 70;
original emphasis).14 We have already seen
that the article focuses on the notions of
arrival, presentation, and ultimately on Hegel’s
claim that “what is to be thought” might be
“unpresentable.” Ancient statuary intervenes
at a particular moment in these debates, with
the nudity of Greek male statues being con-
trasted by Hegel with the robed or veiled
female statues. If, under the sway of the aesthetic
religion then in force, art represented the actions
art’s passing
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of spirit in the historical world, then nudity in
art presents a tendency towards revelation,
whilst modesty or pudeur in art displays the
opposite tendency, towards withdrawal and
secrecy (but also, paradoxically, the exhibition
of that secrecy itself).
Lacoue-Labarthe addresses these questions
in the third section of his article, titled “Immo-
desty: The Veil and the Figure.”Here he makes
it clear that Hegel does not simply take the
plastic arts (and in this case statuary) to
straightforwardly represent the sensible, and
as such as something to be simply overcome
by moving towards the spiritual. Instead, art
is of interest because it represents a conflict
between the sensible and the spiritual. In the
first of two Hegel quotations given by Lacoue-
Labarthe that we shall look at, we can read:
if it is true that from the point of view of sen-
sible beauty, all our preferences must be for
the nude, it is nonetheless the case that sen-
sible beauty does not represent the ultimate
goal that sculpture pursues; thus the Greeks
were not wrong to (re)present the majority of
feminine figures as wearing clothes, whilst
the majority of masculine figures were (re)-
presented nude. (IMP 71)
Secondly: “‘art’s task is precisely to make this
opposition between matter and spirit disappear,
to make the body beautiful, to make this form
more perfect, to animate and spiritualize it’”
(IMP 71). Taken together, these passages
show that art cannot simply be identified with
the sensible, but instead as something like the
destination of the sensible, the way that it is
given force or direction. The sensible body
would thus be perfected, animated, or spiritua-
lized by art, being both itself and responsive to
something beyond itself, being leavened or sea-
soned, and ultimately finding self-fulfilment.
On Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading, Hegel there-
fore is not guilty of any straightforwardly
sexist preference for male form (e.g., that of a
naked athlete) over female form. Instead, the
sexism is of a second, quite possibly more per-
nicious kind, consisting in the praise given to
the ancient Greek practice of producing robed
or veiled statues of women. In Hegel’s
argument, according to Lacoue-Labarthe’s
account, “femininity is only beautiful, in an
ideal sense, when clothed, veiled, partly with-
drawn from the gaze” (IMP 71). This complex
gesture – about which that other interpreter
of the supposedly mysterious Sphinx, Freud,
would doubtless have had much to say – is in
fact classically dialectical.15 The movement of
relève or sublation is one that both suppresses
and maintains its object, removing it from
present circulation or use in order to store it
for later (again: the lofty Hegelian aufheben is
also what one does, in German, to pickles or
preserves). This is what happens to female
nudity on Hegel’s reading: it is both stored
away, given over to the cause of its own spiritua-
lization, and seemingly destined to return to
haunt Hegel despite or precisely due to this
sublation. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Hegel’s visc-
eral reaction to the Romantic novel Lucinde
was due to the fact that this work leaves this
sublation radically incomplete, instead opting
for sexual explicitness and revelation. The tech-
nical grounds for this disapproval – if indeed we
want to accept that such things can be purely
technical – are that due to its emphasis on the
sensible, rather than as something working
towards the spiritual-in-the-sensible, the novel
simply does not qualify as art. As Lacoue-
Labarthe sweepingly states (to summarize
Hegel’s view), “modesty [pudeur] is the
essence of art” (IMP 70). This is expanded
upon shortly afterwards: “Modesty figures the
figure: it is a sensible veil cast over the sensible,
a negation of the negation of the spiritual,
through which the spiritual begins to appear.
– It is art itself” (IMP 74). For Hegel,
modesty or propriety – la pudeur – thus
allows a way of understanding the role that is
proper to art, insofar as it engages with the sen-
sible without having it as its ultimate horizon,
and allows for the figure to be figured in a
self-referentiality or mise-en-abyme.
Whilst Lacoue-Labarthe, with his sympa-
thies for the Romantics, certainly does much
to suggest that Hegel’s reaction to Lucinde
might be reducible to a straightforward sense
of moral disapproval, he also reaches for a
more properly philosophical way of
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understanding the episode. He rejects the
notion of representation as a category based
on metaphysical, binary logic, whereby there
are some things that have form, and others
that do not, with the latter being able to
instantiate themselves in and through the
former. Instead of such a view, Lacoue-
Labarthe is sceptical regarding the existence
of any pure thematic- or content-matter that,
from the outside, could come to inhabit form.
Picking up the terms of robing and veiling
that he has been discussing with Hegel’s
account of statuary as part of Greek aesthetic
religion, he writes that:
The ethical scandal will always have been, in
reality, an æsthetic scandal, the scandal of
æsthetics, which like all scandals in the
eyes of Knowledge and Spirit, unveiled
that there was nothing to unveil. Or at
least that it is possible that there might be
nothing to unveil. In unveiling the figure
in its self-sufficiency, in showing Venus, –
in showing that Venus has nothing to hide,
but that she is simply exhibiting herself
(for the sake of doing so) and that that is
enough for her beauty (that is enough in
order for beauty to exist), æsthetics will
have come close to definitively giving the
figural over to immodesty. (Lacoue-
Labarthe, IMP 86; original emphases)
On this view, there is nothing truly external to
art or the world, and therefore nothing that can
subsequently make an appearance in that art or
world, and ultimately very little substance in
the category of appearance itself. If there is any-
thing to be found there, it doubtless lies in a
secondary or zero-degree definition whereby
any revelation is a revelation of nothing.16
This is precisely what, he argues, so irked
Hegel: the fact that this episode unveiled that
“there was nothing to unveil.” More than this,
Lacoue-Labarthe states that this scandal is the
scandal of æsthetics itself. This is to say that
this entire area of philosophy (and the one
that represented the day jobs of both Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy, as professors of æsthetics)
would be constructed without reference to any
particular subject-matter that it would
attempt to reveal (it would be, as it were, a
theology with no creed). This is quite different
to Hegel’s view of æsthetics as the gradually
unfolding drama of the self-realization or fulfil-
ment of spirit. Because the alienation of spirit is
ultimately overcome, this spirit can be classed
as a sort of caffeine hit that the historical dialec-
tic ultimately delivers. By contrast to this
unfolding drama, Lacoue-Labarthe prefers to
offer a freely associated series of female
figures including Antigone, the Sphinx, and
robed Greek statues, and ultimately concluding
with the contented self-presence of Venus in
her immodest beauty.17 The claim made, over
and against Hegel, by the Romantics and by
Lacoue-Labarthe in their wake, is not simply
that the sensible serves to slow or interrupt
the dialectical realization of spirit, but instead
that the sensible must play a full role in the
new mythology, founded on beauty as truth
and truth as beauty.
4 conclusion: “the gleam of her
self-conscious eye”
We have sought to unpack two associated read-
ings of Hegel’s views on “æsthetic religion,”
having broadly summarized the latter with the
phrase art was, but is not. The first reading
was Nancy’s, which focused on the mechanism
by which art had been said to pass on the work
of the spirit to other, better-equipped dis-
courses. For Nancy, this linear temporality
needs to be deconstructed, and this passing-on
is in fact “infinitely sustained,” constituting a
middle or milieu in which we are still, and
always, located. When taken together with the
additional aspect of the fruits presented by
the young girl representing mortality, this
comes to resemble a (post-)Heideggerian, even
existentialist reading: we are always already
and always still dying, a situation in which art
can help us “consen[t] to death, consent to
existence.”
The second reading of the view that art was,
but is not is that of Lacoue-Labarthe. Dramatiz-
ing the interaction between Hegel and contem-
porary Romantic thinkers, he too presents art
as associated with nothingness – a dissolution
or lack of substantiality that Hegel was at pains
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to cover up, but which the Romantics embraced
in a more mindful way. For both the question of
form was key, the disagreement arising over
whether one emphasizes the march towards
and into self-fulfilment in, through, and ulti-
mately beyond form; or whether one instead
remains haunted by the absurdity of creation
ex nihilo, a haunting that nonetheless pushes
Romanticism towards its programmatic
aspect.18
As a final thought, let us return to the figure
of the young girl bearing fruit as it is used by
Hegel to characterize art’s passing: the
passage from a world in which art was governed
by the Muses and (allegedly) played a plenary
role in society. In the same section of the Phe-
nomenology quoted in our epigraph, Hegel
writes:
the young girl who presents us the plucked
fruits as a gift is more than the nature that
immediately provided them, more than the
nature that unfurls into their conditions
and elements, into the trees, air, light, etc.,
while in a higher way she gathers all this
together into the gleam of her self-conscious
eye and her offertory gesture; just as she is
more than that nature, so too the spirit of
the fate that provides us with those works
of art is more than the ethical life and actu-
ality of that people, for it is the inwardiz-
ing-recollecting of the spirit in them that
was still alienated.19
This seems in fact to contradict the gloss we saw
Nancy giving to the figure of the girl – namely,
that she “has no existence other than that of the
fruits that she presents” (M 96). We can recall
that this was Nancy’s jumping-off point for
his reflections on existence and mortality,
with the detachment of the fruits from the
tree – i.e., that of the arts from the civic life
that nourished them – forming an irreversible
step, quite possibly a tragic one. In Hegel’s
text, however, the fruits are detached from
the tree only to be framed in an alternative
setting: the girl “gathers all this together into
the gleam of her self-conscious eye […] the
spirit of the fate that provides us with those
works of art […] is the inwardizing-recollecting
of the spirit in them that was still alienated.” In
other words, the detachment of the fruits is no
tragedy but instead a fitting end. The fruits
want to be eaten and the æsthetic religion
wants to be overcome: which is to say that
ancient Greek æsthetic religion does not
merely service the needs of its social setting,
but by doing so, drives the spirit of history
forwards, producing the dialectic.
Hegel’s dramatization of art’s passing in the
figure of the girl shows that he is not just a
forger of concepts, someone deaf to the
charms of literature.20 Rather than a stiffly alle-
gorical figure, the girl bearing fruit is a beguil-
ing one. Her gleaming eye gives life to the
dynamics of presentation themselves, drawing
attention away from whatever the existence,
properties or characteristics of the fruits (i.e.,
the arts) might be, and instead causes us to
question what proto-psychoanalytical game of
projection and transference, good objects and
bad objects, we are playing when we discuss
ancient art. This is to say that she causes the
gaze we cast upon the fruit to become proble-
matic: perhaps it is not always or not only the
other who wallows in mythology while we rest
assured of our logical objectivity.
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy react to such
epistemic unsettledness in different ways: for
the former, it is not clear that we have ever
fully purged our discourse of the patterns of
piety and observance usually ascribed to reli-
gious thinking; he writes of modern literature’s
self-conceptualization as a “‘new mythology,’”
with its “endless procession of priests and sec-
taries, mystics and martyrs, clerics and inquisi-
tors, accursed and apostates, soldier-monks and
heretics, prophets, saints and schismatics, blas-
phemers and profanes.”21 In short, he writes,
“the entire Church repeated itself in Literature,
as well as all the ancient forms of worship.”22
Here we see the importance of Romanticism
for him – ultimately, all modern literature,
knowingly or not, falls into a paradigm seized
on at Jena.
With Nancy, on the other hand, his work
provides a formidable resource for rethinking
the triad of tree, fruit, and girl (i.e., ancient
society, its æsthetic religion, and the way it is
presented or comes down to us). It is beyond
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the capacities of this essay to say whether in
sabotaging the transcendence of the spiritual
he gives an outsized role to the materiality of
the world and/or art, or whether he ultimately
follows Hegel in seeing the entirety of modern
(i.e., post-classical) art as a Christian phenom-
enon based on a structure of incarnation. It
remains important to note that close readers
of his work have found reason to suspect it of
something like a new materialism.23 Nonethe-
less, his insistence on a metaphorics of space
– opening, stretching, folding, touching,
moving – means that his work can be of great
assistance as we attempt to think outside linear-
ity and beyond the economy of ends.
echo by jean-luc nancy
With its often-refined language, it is rather dif-
ficult for me to find my way into this text –
although I believe I can roughly follow the
reading and analysis of Hegel’s “young girl car-
rying fruit.” I must say that, since the period in
which I wrote the texts so well examined by
John McKeane, this young girl has often contin-
ued to give me food for thought. I think I did
not pay enough attention to the very gesture
by which Hegel extracted a figure – very concre-
tely – , from a book of engravings depicting the
frescoes of Pompeii (a book I have seen a copy
of). I commented on the figure itself without
dwelling on the fact that Hegel spotted and
retained it. Yet, it is a work of art in question
(its exact historical and artistic connection
with the great classical Greek art, especially
sculpture). It is itself a work of the art, which
it thus not merely presents as preservation of
the past, but also as the very presence of the
bearer of offerings. Priestess of a new cult –
that of the museum, which is not described
without irony, with its libation of dust – the
young girl nevertheless fulfils a real office,
and thus in some way a real presentation that
is, together with that of the fruits, I repeat,
that of the young girl herself. Undeniably, she
finds a real presence there and her image in
the museum animates a graceful movement
that catches the eye of the philosopher. She
catches it precisely by way of her own “self-
conscious eye,” making her a spiritual prin-
ciple, as Hegel says. But what he does not say
is that it is itself an artwork – an artwork of
the past preserved and reproduced, much
more so than a document, for it communicates
to us an “interiorisation,” Hegel says, of the
art’s spirit. This young girl forms a kind of
intermediary between the sculptures of classical
art and the person of Christ. This can be under-
stood both as a succession in the surpassing of
art and as the preservation (and the taking
over?) by the memory of art right up to the
edge of “revealed religion,” in which – as we
know from the Aesthetics, even if it is absent
from the Phenomenology – art will be no less
present.
This extension can only be made on the basis
of Hegel’s outlook on a bearer of offerings
drawn after a fresco from Pompeii: on the
basis of an aesthetic (and sentimental-erotic)
emotion thus, experienced at the heart of
thought busy overcoming the aesthetic. And
in Hegel, much else bears witness to this
emotion…
This is the extension I
propose to John McKeane, or
at least to his project, to
thank him for having, in his
turn, awakened the young girl
in us.
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notes
1 Hegel §753, 432.
2 The following statement can be found in Hegel’s
work: “For us art counts no longer as the
highest mode in which truth procures existence
for itself” in Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art,
trans. T.M. Knox, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon,
1975) 103.
3 Nancy, Les Muses 75 (trans. by Peggy Kamuf as
The Muses). Future references to this French
edition will be abbreviated M. Due to this piece
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being finished during the Covid-19 lockdown of
2020, this is my translation, as are all those that
follow, unless stated otherwise.
4 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy; amongst other
texts, see Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, “Noli me
frangere” (1982) collected in Nancy, Demande: Lit-
térature et philosophie (trans. by Robert Bononno
as Expectation: Philosophy, Literature).
5 Lacoue-Labarthe, “L’imprésentable” 53–95 (63;
future references will bear the abbreviation IMP).
Lacoue-Labarthe also writes that:
the “application” to art of the Fichtean prin-
ciple of the absoluteness of the (abstract) self
means that “nothing appears to have any
proper value but only that imprinted on it
by the subjectivity of the self.” In the same
way, the Romantic artist’s transformation,
setting-in-form, figuration, or even fictioning
(Gestaltung, Bildung, etc.), of his life leads to
something that cannot be “taken seriously.”
(IMP 62)
6 Ibid.
7 Nancy, “Menstruum universale: La dissolution lit-
téraire” (1977), Demande, op. cit. (trans. by
Robert Bononno as “Menstruum universale: Lit-
erary Dissolution,” Expectation, op. cit.).
8 Nancy, “La jeune fille qui succède aux Muses (la
naissance hégélienne des arts),” Les Muses; “The
Young Girl who Succeeds the Muses (the Hegelian
Birth of the Arts),” The Muses, op. cit., 41–55.
9 On the confluence of aesthetics and phenomen-
ology, see Nancy, The Pleasure of Drawing:
Drawing is not a given, available, formed
form. On the contrary, it is the gift, inven-
tion, appearance, or birth of form. “That a
form comes” is drawing’s formula, and this
formula implies at the same time the desire
for and the anticipation of form. (3; trans.
mod.)
10 Other discussions of the topic can be found in
Heikkilä 26–28 and James 202–30.
11 See also James’s discussion of “Le Portrait de
l’art en jeune fille” (“Portrait of Art as a Young
Girl”), in The Fragmentary Demand 206ff.
12 Such is the interpretation given of Nancy’s
(modern) aesthetics by Martta Heikkilä: “Just as
there is no being in general but only the singular
existence of existing things, there is no art ‘in
general’ which would grant a uniqueness or a
unity of origin to art” (26).
13 Jacques Rancière also mentions the fruits’
detachment:
The young girl of whom Hegel speaks, the
one who succeeds the Muses, offers us the
fruits picked from the tree, the veiled
memory, “without effectiveness,” of the life
that carried the artworks. But, precisely,
these works are such only because their
world, the world of nature fulfilling itself in
culture, is no longer, or perhaps never was,
except in the retrospection of thought. (13;
original emphasis)
14 He also contrasts the social experiments
informing Lucinde with Hegel’s view of marriage:
We should not understand the “substantiality
of marriage” to mean anything other, ulti-
mately, than the “intellectual and moral” attri-
bution, for the two sexes, of their respective
roles, which is to say that these roles are
subject to a relève – the suppression, reten-
tion, elevation, spiritualization and humaniza-
tion within a living unity that actively
produces meaning, of the natural difference
of the sexes. (Lacoue-Labarthe, IMP 66)
15 Freud received for his fiftieth birthday a medal-
lion with his own bust on one side, and on the
other Œdipus and the Sphinx, with the legend in
Sophocles’s Greek “he who knew the famous
riddles and was a most powerful man.” See Arm-
strong 52.
16 See Nancy in The Pleasure of Drawing: “Beautiful
form – that is, drawing […] [in the] sense of what
draws itself – opens a revelation. Revelation is quite
different from the appearance of something that
was hidden. It is, rather, the appearance of what
was never hidden” (105; original emphasis).
17 On Venus’s unexpected appearance in Lacoue-
Labarthe’s text, Marta B. Helfer comments:
is this Aphrodite, this tutelary goddess of aes-
thetics, the necessary figure for the scandal of
the æsthetic? Does this figure perhaps repeat
or mime a little too programmatically the
Hegelian, “phallogocentric” identification of
woman with the sensuous, the fictional, the
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narcissistic – that is, the hypersubjective,
which is to say, the scandalous? (112)
18 See Antoine Berman’s study of German
Romantic thought through the lens of translation.
He writes:
through Bildung an individual, a people, a
nation, but also a language, a literature, a
work of art in general are formed and thus
acquire a form, a Bild. Bildung is always a
movement toward a form, one’s own form –
which is to say that, in the beginning, every
being is deprived of its form. (Berman 43–
44; original emphases)
19 Hegel §753.
20 The topos of finding one’s argument against
Hegel already legislated for in his works appears
in Michel Foucault:
to really escape Hegel presupposes […]
taking the measure of how far the recourse
we have against him is also, again, perhaps
one more trick that he plays on us and
which, after it has gone its course, we find
him waiting, immobile and elsewhere. (75)
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